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Abstract: The internal complexity of lifeline systems and their interdependencies amplify the 
vulnerability of external disruptions. We consider lifeline infrastructures as a network system 
with supply, transshipment, demand nodes and arcs constructed between node-pair for 
conveying service flows. The complex interactive network system can be modeled as 
multi-layered graphs, whereby the power network depends on the gas network linked through 
the gasified power plants. Similarly, the water network depends on both quality and quantity 
of power supply. A successful emergency rescue can make lifeline infrastructures more 
resilient against natural disasters and unexpected accidents. This study focuses on a resource 
allocation and schedule problem to restore the most critical components quickly in the 
multiple interdependent lifeline infrastructures under disruptions. The key objectives of quick 
response model include reducing the overall losses caused by the accidents, and restoring 
system functions as quickly as possible. The Resource Allocation Model (RAM) for rescue 
was formulated as a two-stage mixed-integer programming, in which the first stage problem 
aims to minimize the total losses, while the second stage problem is to optimize resource 
allocation for rescue service within the rescue time horizon using the proposed heuristic 
algorithm in polynomial complexity. In the meantime, those tasks/components to be repaired 
are selected by the proposed vulnerability analysis method to guarantee the optimal whole 
network efficiency, and then put them into the Resource Allocation Model. The simulation 
results demonstrate that the proposed approaches are both efficient and effective to solve the 
real-life post-disaster resource allocation problem.  
 
 
Keywords: Decision support systems, Quick response, Resource allocation, Two-stage 
programming, Vulnerability analysis 
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1. Introduction 
In the past century, the infrastructures of urban cities have faced immense strains as a result of 
dramatic growth in population. Correspondingly, the increasing complexity and 
interdependencies of lifeline infrastructures pose new challenges for security and operations 
management because of their large-scale, nonlinear, and time-dependent properties. Such 
lifeline systems are often considered as a network system consisting of supply, demand, and 
transshipment components (nodes and arcs) including electric power, gas, water supply, food, 
telecommunications, and transportation, to provide platforms for service delivery. The 
complexity nature of the network makes the lifeline systems vulnerable to failures, which may 
cause widespread negative consequences. It has being becoming the most susceptible part for 
the economic, social, and environment development in all cities (De Sherbinin, 2007; Aven, 
2011; Murray, 2013).  
 
The occurrence of several cascading failures in the past typically causes huge property loss 
and significant restoration cost (Chai, 2011; Collier, 2008). For example, in July and August of 
1996, the Western US grid experienced outages affecting 11 of the US States and 2 Canadian 
Provinces. More recently in December 1998 blackout in San Mateo cascaded to affect 2 
million people in the San Francisco Bay Area. Therefore, the cities should take all feasible 
measures to strengthen their response capabilities to ensure essential services. From the 
viewpoint of sustainability, a city cannot achieve the goal of sustainability if the operations of 
its lifeline network are vulnerable (Turner, 2003; Turner II, 2010). 
 
In the ensuing sections, we shall elaborate on the existing researches, which focus on the 
survivability of systems under nature disasters or man-made accidents (Murray, 2007; San, 
2007; Kamissoko, 2014). The first stream of the research mainly focuses on malicious attacks 
and network interdiction problems based on the complex network topology methods (Azaiez, 
2007; Hausken, 2011; Rocco, 2011). The second stream studies the network flow problems 
under disruptions (Garg and Smith, 2008; Sorokin, 2013;), which is formulated as IO model 
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that could effectively evaluate the performance of the whole network at each time period. The 
third stream focuses on network vulnerability analysis including network design and 
operations against blackout based on the network topology, which is largely used to identify 
the critical components in the network (Fiedrich, 2000; Alguacil, 2010; Zio, 2012).  
 
The approaches used to solve the post-disaster resource allocation problem include applied 
statistical and probabilistic models combined with multi-objective programming, two-stage 
model and dynamic model (Yan, 2009; Shan, 2012; Samuel, 2012; Yatesa, 2012; Srdjevic, 
2013). Specifically, Barbarosoğlu and Arda (2004) proposed a two-stage stochastic 
programming model to plan the transportation of vital ﬁrst-aid commodities to 
disaster-affected areas during emergency response; Lee (2007) formulated a mixed integer 
model to design optimal responding strategies for emergencies with the objective of 
minimizing cost; Scaparra and Church (2008) identified the most cost-effective way of 
allocating protective resources among the facilities of an existing but vulnerable system using 
bi-level programming in such a way that the impact of the most disruptive attack on the 
unprotected facilities is minimized; Cavdaroglu et al. (2013) formulated a service restoration 
and job scheduling in interdependent systems; and Wex et al. (2014) proposed and compared 
several heuristics for allocating available rescue units to incidents with the objective of 
minimizing the sum of completion times weighted by severity.  
Furthermore, since the resource allocation problem could be generalized to the unrelated 
parallel machine scheduling problems, many heuristic algorithms could also be used to solve 
the resource allocation problem (Su, 2009; Lin, 2011; Yeh, 2013).   
 
However, in the existing resource allocation studies, there are two problems that require 
further discussion. The first is that the objective of most models only focuses on minimization 
of the overall costs (Brown, 2005; Shen, 2013; Zhang, 2011), while studies focus on 
minimization of the completion time is by far limited (Faraj, 2006; Wex, 2014). The total 
losses could not be solely measured in terms of costs because the consequences as a result of 
accidents are hard to be assessed, in other word, it doesn’t make sense to trade off the costs 
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and the restoration time. Therefore, during the rescue time horizon, the minimization of the 
restoration time should take priority for stakeholders in their decision-making process. The 
second problem is that in the accidents, the interconnectivities of the lifeline network may 
trigger cascading failures, which can result in the amplifications of the overall losses, therefore, 
the whole network efficiency shall be considered as the most important metric during the 
resource allocation assessment procedure. In this study, we consider the emergency allocation 
problem with limited resources and restoration time for the lifeline systems with the 
consideration of the whole network efficiency. To solve the resource allocation and scheduling 
problem, we utilize the network system vulnerability analysis method to sort those critical 
components to be repaired, and then put them into the two-stage mixed integer model 
formulated. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the lifeline emergency resource 
allocation model, which is formulated as a two-stage programming. Section 3 presents the 
proposed algorithms to solve the two-stage programming. Section 4 demonstrates the 
computational results and some discussions. Conclusions are detailed in the final Section. 
2. Two-stage Resource Allocation Model 
2.1 Problem Description 
In the study, we focus on lifeline systems with three sub-systems，which include gas, power, 
and water systems, whereby the power network depends on the gas network through the 
gasified power plants, and the water network depends on both quality and quantity of power 
supply. Thus, there exist functional connections among the different layers, which means the 
supply layers are too important to trigger the demand layers failure if any disruption happens. 
Meanwhile, the network is composed of supply, transshipment, and demand components in 
each layer as shown in Fig.1.  
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Fig. 1. Interdependent multi-layered lifeline systems network 
Such three-layered network could be denoted as a directed graph ( , )G A V  with nodes 
nv V ( 1,2, ,n N ), and directed arcs ia A ( 1,2, ,i I ) which connect service flow 
within each layer and between the node-pair ( , )m nv v P , where P  represents the set of 
node-pair. Moreover, ria  ( 1,2, ,r R ) represents the r th destroyed arcs with 
r
ia  ; 
accordingly, rnv ( 1, 2, ,r R R R    ) represents the r th destroyed nodes, with 
r
nv  . In 
other word, the destroyed components include all destroyed arcs and nodes, which belong to 
destroyed components set . For rescue tasks, we have rescue team k  ( k K ), each rescue 
team has different capabilities to repair the destroyed components as each rescue team can be 
a group consisting of technicians with different skills. 
 
The rescue procedure is that the top-layer decision makers give orders to rescue teams, and 
then rescue teams have to meet the requirements of the task. In this study, we stand on the 
rescue teams’ point of view, the goal is to take time priority against restoration costs because 
of the time sensitive character in emergency case to optimize the efficiency of the whole 
lifeline system. To achieve the goal, we first select critical destroyed components ria   to 
be repaired to ensure the maximization of lifeline system network efficiency within rescue 
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time horizon T , then, we assign the determined tasks from top-layer decision makers to 
each rescue team k  ( k K ) within the time horizon T . 
2.2 Notations and Variables 
In order to facilitate our explanation, the following notations and variables will be used 
throughout this paper. 
Parameters: 
iu     capacity of arc ia  
nu     capacity of transshipment node n nv V   
nf       supply or demand at node nv  
i
opc       cost associated with flow along arc ia  
r
rec       repair cost of arc 
r
ia  
n       punishment cost for unmet demand of node nv  per unit 
       restoration cost of per time unit 
rk    time required by the k th rescue team to process disrupted arc 
r
ia  
rkT      completion time for the k th rescue team to process arc 
r
ia  
Variables:  
itx      flow on arc ia  at period t  
nts      slack associated with node nv  at period t  
rl      {0,1}rl  , 1rl   if arc 
r
ia  is selected to repair; otherwise, 0rl   
rkz     {0,1}rkz  , 1rkz   if arc 
r
ia  is allocated to the k th team; otherwise, 0rkz   
rr kb      {0,1}rr kb   , 1rr kb    if 
r
ia  is a preceding component of 
r
ia

 in the processing list 
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of the k th team; otherwise, 0rr kb    
n
mty     {0,1}
n
mty  , 1
n
mty   if connection of node-pair ( , )m nv v  is effective at period t ; 
otherwise, 0
n
mty   
it     {0,1}it  , 1it   if arc ia  is destroyed at period t ; otherwise, 0it   
 
2.3 Problem Assumptions 
The followings are the underlying assumptions in the model for the above mentioned problem. 
 The initial condition of each component in the infrastructure system is known by the 
sensors/monitors in the systems once the event happened; 
 Unmet demand of supply nodes will cause both transshipment and demand nodes total 
failure for any node-pair among different layers caused by their interdependencies among 
the system in terms of their supply and demand links (For example, if the power supply 
cannot be satisfied for the corresponding infrastructure in the water system, then the water 
infrastructure will be out of work); 
 We assume that all the teams are capable to repair the destroyed components with 
different completing time to recover their original operation level except the dysfunction 
of the components;  
 Without loss of generality, any un-repaired arc is assumed to lose its function during the 
time horizon.  
2.4 Mathematical Model  
We begin by giving definitions for the problem as below. 
Definition 1. Define all arcs ia  flow into nodes nv  as the inflow arcs; which belong to set 
n

; accordingly, define all arcs ia  flow out of nodes nv  as outflow arcs, which belong to 
set n

. 
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Definition 2. Define the nodes nv  in any layer with solely outflow arcs as supply nodes, 
which belong to set V ; accordingly, define the nodes nv  in any layer with solely inflow arcs 
as demand nodes, which belong to set V
+
; while define those nodes 
nv  in any layer with 
both inflow and outflow arcs as transshipment nodes, which belong to set V
=
; furthermore, we 
have V V V V V V        . 
Definition 3. For the initial status of any destroyed arc ria  , we have 0it   when 0t  ; 
while for the initial status of any destroyed node r
nv  , we have 0it   for all arcs 
i n na  
   when 0t  .  
Definition 4. Let rt  be the restoration period of the r th destroyed component (
r
ia  or 
r
nv ), 
when rt t , for arc 
r
ia , we have 1it  ; while for node 
r
nv , we have 1it   for all 
\i n na  
  , which are connected with node rnv . 
Based on the above assumptions and definitions, the resource allocation model (RAM) can be 
formulated as two-stage programming model as follows. 
 
Stage I: 
Min 
: : \( , ) , :( , ) :
( (1 ))
r
i m m n m n i
i n r
op it m mt m m mt re r
t T i a A m v V v v P m n v v P r a
C c x s f y c l  
     
            (1) 
s.t. 
: i n
it n
i a
x f
 
  t , : nn v V   (2) 
 
: i n
nt it n
i a
s x f
 
    t , : nn v V   (3) 
 
: :
0
i n j n
it jt
i a j a
x x
   
    t , : nn v V   (4) 
 
: i n
it n
i a
x u
 
  t , : nn v V   (5) 
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 (1 )( )nmt mt ms y f    t , , : ( , ) ,  m n mm n v v P v V    (6) 
 
: i n
n
it n mt
i a
x f y
 
  t , , : ( , ) ,  m n mm n v v P v V    (7) 
 
: i n
n
it n mt
i a
x f y
 
   t , , : ( , ) ,  m n mm n v v P v V    (8) 
 
: i n
n
it n mt
i a
x u y
 
  t , , : ( , ) ,  m n mm n v v P v V    (9) 
 
it i itx u   t , :
r
ii a   (10) 
 
rr k r rk rkb b z    , : , ,  
r r
i ir r a a r r
    , k  (11) 
 
rr k r rk r kb b z     , : , ,  
r r
i ir r a a r r
    , k  (12) 
 1rr k r rk rk r kb b z z       , : , ,  
r r
i ir r a a r r
    , k  (13) 
 (1 )r k rk r k rr kT T p M b       , : , ,  
r r
i ir r a a r r
    , k  (14) 
 
rk rk rk
k K
T p z

  : rir a  , k  (15) 
 , , 0it nt rkx s T   ,  t : ,  nn v V  : ii a A   (16) 
  , , , 0,1nmt rk rr k ity z b    t , : ii a A  , :
r
ir a  , k  (17) 
 
Stage II: 
Min 
:
max
r
i
rk rk
k K
r a
z 


     (18) 
s.t. rk r
k K
z l

  : rir a   (19) 
 
:
( )
r
i
rk rk
r a
z T

  k  (20) 
  0,1rkz   k , :
r
ir a   (21) 
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In Stage I model, expression (1) represents the minimization of the total costs of the network 
system during time horizon T, aggregated from the operation costs, punishment costs for the 
unmet demands, startup cost, and repairing costs. Constraints (2) to (10) are about the network 
flow problems, while Constraints (11) to (15) describe the restrictions on the scheduling 
problems. Constraint (2) limits the total outflow of each supply node to be lower than its 
supply capacity. Constraint (3) ensures that the slacking flow amount of each demand node, 
and Constraint (4) enforces the flow balance for transshipment nodes. Constraint (5) sets the 
restriction that the total outflow of each transship node should not exceed its own transship 
capacity. Constraint (6) reflects Assumption 2, for node-pair ( , )m nv v , the function of nv  will 
become invalid if the demand of mv  is not satisfied. Once the demand of mv  has been 
satisfied, the function of nv will restore immediately. Constraints (7)-(9) ensure that node nv  
is invalid if the binary variable nmty  is zero. In addition, each component has capacity 
constraint, which is represented in Constraint (10). A precedence relation exists between two 
components if and only if both of them are assigned to the same rescue team by Constraints 
(11)-(13). Constraint (14) defines the completion time of each repaired arc considering their 
precedence relation and processing time. Constraint (15) ensures that the completion time of 
the first job of each team is no less than its processing time. Constraint (16) ensures 
non-negativity restrictions and intermediate variables, whilst Constraint (17) ensures the 
binary variables.  
 
The Stage II model can be formulated as a non-identical parallel machine scheduling problem, 
where the goal is to minimize the makespan as presented in formula (18). Constraint (19) 
ensures that each selected component can be assigned to sole rescue team. Constraint (20) 
ensures that the makespan lies within the time horizon, and Constraint (21) ensures the binary 
variable. 
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3. Algorithms Development 
To solve the two-stage model, firstly, we have to select which component/group of 
components to be repaired, then put these critical components into the two-stage model as 
input, then a heuristic algorithm is developed to assign the disrupted components r
ia  to 
rescue team k  in Stage II, which has been proven NP-hard; knowing the rescue team 
assignment plan, the rescue sequences of each team can be sorted to minimize the total cost in 
Stage I programming, which is a Mixed Integer Linear Programming problem and can be 
solved by CPLEX. As a result, the algorithm consists of the following three major steps and 
can be summarized as follows. 
Step 1: Select the critical group of components to be repaired in rescue time horizon to make 
the whole network be the most efficient, the details of vulnerability analysis process 
are shown in Section 3.1; 
Step 2: Decide the rescue teams assignment scheme based on the tasks/components to be 
repaired (result from Step 1) by solving the Stage II model using the proposed 
heuristic algorithm to ensure restoration time minimization restricted by whole 
network efficiency maximization, the details of Stage II algorithm are shown in 
Section 3.2; 
Step 3: Compute the total rescue costs by solving Stage I model using CPLEX to ensure total 
rescue costs minimization restricted by restoration time minimization, the details are 
shown in Section 3.3. 
3.1 The Critical Groups Selection Based on Vulnerability Analysis  
Step 1 is to identify the critical group of components to be repaired, because not all destroyed 
components can be repaired within given time horizon. Considering the interdependencies and 
cascading failures in the network, components are evaluated by group rather than individually. 
For example, although arc a may be more important than b, c individually, the combination of 
arcs b and c may have most efficient network performance compared with the arc a only. As a 
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result, weighted network efficiency *( )E  is employed as the indicator for the selection, 
which can assess the vulnerability improvement after certain group of arcs * are repaired. 
*( )E  can be calculated by Eq. (22).  
            
*
, :
1 1
( )
( 1)
m n
mn
m n v v V mn
E w
N N d 
 

    (22) 
Where *( )E  denotes the network efficiency when all destroyed components belong to 
*  
are repaired, and N  represents the total number of nodes in the network. The parameter mnd  
denotes the shortest path length between any node mv  and nv , which is calculated by 
Dijkstra algorithm. 
mnw  denotes the weight of each path in the network, which is normalized 
as maxmn mnw x x , where mnx  is the minimal arc flow along the shortest path from mv  to 
nv  before the accidents and maxx  is the maximal arc flow before the accidents.  
 
At meanwhile, the other metric to evaluate the whole infrastructure system performance under 
study is to restore as many components as possible during time horizon. Since the critical 
group selection process from destroyed sets  is proved as NP-hard problem, we employ 
NSGA-II for the multi-objective problem to maximize network efficiency and minimize group 
size in order to obtain the list of critical groups in different size. The steps of NSGA-II can be 
shown as follows. 
 Initial solution generation 
For destroyed set , each chromosome is represented by R  random 0-1 variables. If the 
components are selected, then the corresponding bits of chromosome are 1, otherwise, they are 
0. From that we can generate an initial solution with the population size of S . 
 Generation of offspring population  
Following Step 1, we generate an offspring of size S  from parents’ generation using 
crossover, and mutation operators. The crossover procedure selects randomly from its parents’ 
genes to generate the offspring as represented in Fig. 2. As for the mutation procedure, a gene 
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is randomly selected and changed based on the mutation rate as shown in Fig. 3. 
D11 D12 D13 D14 D15 D16 
  
D11 D22 D13 D24 D15 D26 
 
D21 D22 D23 D24 D25 D26 
Fig. 2. Uniform crossover of chromosome 
 
 
D11 D12 D13 D14 D15 D16 
 
D11 D12 D13 D14 D25 D16 
Fig. 3. The mutation mechanism 
 Determination of a new generation 
We first combine parent and offspring population into a set followed by calculating the 
network efficiency and group size for each individual. The new generation is then selected 
using the non-dominated ranking approach as shown follows. 
Sort the chromosomes using the non-dominated ranking approach and identify 
fronts iF , then calculate the crowding distance of each individual in iF . 
Set G  , 1i  .While 
iG F S  , do 
{ }iG G F  
1i i   
Sort solutions in iF  in descending sequence in accordance with crowding 
distance, then add the first M G  individuals to G . 
G is the next generation with size S . 
 Iteration and stopping criteria 
As the population size and the number of generations depend on specific problem, the iteration 
Parent 1 
Offspring 
Parent 2 
Parent  
Offspring  
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is terminated if the stopping criteria are reached. 
 
3.2 Algorithm Development of Stage II Model 
The Stage II programming is treated as a non-identical parallel machine scheduling problem 
with components to be repaired by K  emergency rescue teams, the difference is that 
Constraint (20) restricts the makespan to be within rescue time horizon T. In what follows, we 
will discuss about the number of components that could be repaired within the time horizon. 
Definition 4: Let upl  be the biggest group size of destroyed components to be repaired, 
which means the number of destroyed components to be repaired by the most efficient rescue 
team during the time horizon, where the minimal processing time for each destroyed 
component is minrk rk
k K
k K
p p

  , : arir  . 
Definition 5: Let ave  be the optimal makespan if the repairing of each component is 
assumed to be detachable, so max min{ , }ave k T    , and min ave k    , k K . 
 
The relationship among ave , max , and min  are shown in the following Fig. 4, where an 
initial solution with max 1ave    , min 2ave     is represented in Fig. 4a , and max  is 
shortened by reducing 1  to 1 , and 2  to 2  in Fig. 4b, thus we could get an improved 
solution max . 
 
          4a. Initial solution                    4b. Iteration Solution      
Fig. 4. The explanation of the heuristic algorithm 
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Lemma 1: The optimal group size of the critical group satisfies l* < l
up
. 
 
For each possible group size, we have to choose the critical group to ensure the makespan 
within time horizon T . Therefore, for a given set of components to be repaired, we propose a 
heuristic algorithm to search the optimal critical the group size in the available rescue teams 
from 
upl . 
 
Lemma 2: Let low  be the lower bound of optimal solution, if repairing each component is 
assumed to be detachable, there exists low ave   . 
 
Proof: For a contradiction, we assume that ave low    in some cases, which means 
low ave     ( 0  ). If all jobs could be completed within low , then low  is the optimal 
makespan when the repairing of each component is assumed to be detachable, which contracts 
with Definition 5. For another contradiction, assume ave low   , which means 
low ave     ( 0  ). As   could be reduced to zero by assigning any parts of jobs to other 
rescue teams, which contracts with our assumption. Therefore, neither ave low    nor 
ave low    is right, thus we can deduce that low ave    exists. 
 
Lemma 3: In an optimal solution, there will be maxminopt   . 
 
Proof: Assume that the optimal solution is max , then from Definition 5, we know 
that max min{ , }ave k T    ; meanwhile there also exists another feasible solution 
' '
max min{ , }ave k T    , with 
'
k k   . According to Lemma 2, we have ave opt    and 
hence, 
' 0k k    . This implies 
'
max max   , which contracts with the assumption. 
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 How to obtain lower bound low  
To calculate low , we consider a scenario that the repair of each component is detachable. The 
Stage II model can be transformed into a Linear Programming (LP) in which {0,1}rkz   is 
replaced by 0rkz  ( ,k r ). According to Lemma 1, the optimal solution of LP can be seen as 
the lower bound.  
 How to obtain the optimal solution 
According to Lemma 2, we proposed an algorithm to minimize k  by ordinal assignment 
and swap between the longest team and the shortest team as shown in Fig. 2b. The detailed 
steps are described as below. 
Step 1: Initial solution 
We first find the optimal solution using LP, then the initial solution is obtained 
by assigning each component to team * argmax r
k K
kk z

 . 
Step 2: Ordinal re-assignment process 
Set B  . 
Select the kth  team for which maxk   , and sort components in the kth  
team according to k low  by non-decreasing sequence. 
For team 
\
arg min k
k K B
k

    
If \ { }B K k , then 
for any component i  in the k th team 
if maxk ik     , assign the i th component to the k th  team and  
return to Step 2; 
       else set { }B B k ; 
     Else, go to Step 3. 
Step 3: Ordinal interchange process 
Set B  . 
 Select the kth  team for which maxk   .  
 For team 
\
arg min k
k K B
k

    
If \ { }B K k , then 
for any component i  in the kth  team 
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for any component j  in the k th  team 
if min{ 1 ik jkGain    , max2 ( )} 0k jk ikGain           , then 
exchange ( , )i j and return to Step 2;  
else if no arc pair could be exchanged, set { }B B k ; 
Else, go to Step 4. 
Step 4: Ending 
Set 
max max{ }k
k K
   , end the algorithm. 
 
 Computational complexity analysis 
From the above procedure, one can find that the Stage II is an assignment problem with k  
rescue teams and r  jobs, the computational complexity is 
2 2( ) ( ) ( )O kr O kr O kr  . 
 
Table 1 shows the proposed heuristic algorithm efficiency compared with branch and bound 
algorithm by CPLEX in running six times. One can see from the result that the time 
consumption of branch and bound method increases with the size of the problem, while the 
proposed heuristic algorithm is capable to solve large-size problem efficiently and with the 
gap less than 3.1%.  
Table 1. Comparison with heuristic algorithm and branch and bound algorithm  
No. of 
Teams 
No. of 
Components 
No. of 
Constraints 
  No. of 
Variables 
CPLEX  Heuristic Algorithm 
 
GAP 
Results Time (s) Results Time (s) (%) 
4 10 14 54 79 0.39 79 0.12 0 
4 20 16 64 22 430 22 0.12 0 
5 10 15 65 62 0.41 62 0.11 0 
5 20 25 125 95 387 98 0.16 3.1 
9 50 59 509 42 365 42 0.13 0 
10 50 60 560 56 393 56 0.13 0 
 
3.3 Stage I Solution Procedure  
Knowing the critical group obtained by the heuristic algorithm in Stage II, the rescue teams 
are assigned to those components in the critical group. In this section, the sequences for those 
components to be repaired are sorted in each team using ILOG CPLEX. The objective of 
Stage I is to minimize the total costs by iterating the repairing sequence in the sub-group.  
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4. Case Study  
4.1 Problem Statement 
Shanghai is a coastal city in China. It lies on the southeastern frontier of Yangtze Delta, 
therefore, it contains many rivers, canals, and lakes, and is known for its rich water resources. 
In recent years, the disaster prone city has experienced natural disasters such as typhoons and 
floods quite often, which has resulted in considerable damage in lifeline systems. In particular, 
the scenarios under consideration include lifeline systems of gas, power, and water systems in 
4 districts of Fengxian, Jinshan, Nanhui, and Minhang in Shanghai, as shown in Fig. 5.  
 
Fig. 5. Scenario based lifeline infrastructures in Shanghai 
We consider the key infrastructures in the 4 districts, which consist of 9 gas, 14 power, and 9 
water infrastructures and 51 links, which constitute a three-layered network as a whole lifeline 
system. Each sub-system (water, gas, power) can be seen as a network with three categories of 
nodes, which are supply, transshipment and demand nodes. For each time period, the demand 
nodes require certain amount of supply to maintain their normal operations.  
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Fig. 6. Disrupted multi-layer lifeline network  
Generally speaking, the capacity of the supply nodes is always equal to the demand nodes, and 
the demand data of nodes of lifeline systems show is in Table 2. Once events happened, there 
are 12 links disrupted in different functions in the lifeline system, which can be seen in Fig.6. 
Knowing the task of repairing 16 arcs, the goal of the post-disaster rescue is to minimize the 
cost under the guarantee of completion time minimized. In this case, the destroyed 
components 12R  , the emergency rescue teams 3K  , and the time horizon 24T   
hours. The details of those destroyed components are presented in Table 3 and the details of 
operation cost, and capacity of each arc are presented in Table 4. 
Table 2. Demand data of nodes of lifeline systems 
Node 
Gas System Power System Water System 
Type 
Average 
Demand 
Type 
Average 
Demand 
Type 
Average 
Demand 
1 supply -150 demand 20 demand 50 
2 supply -100 demand 30 supply -180 
3 supply 0 demand 40 demand 40 
4 transit 0 transit 0 demand 110 
5 demand 25 demand 35 transit 0 
6 demand 35 supply -250 demand 20 
7 demand 40 demand 80 demand 80 
8 demand 100 transit 0 supply -200 
9 demand 10 demand 10 demand 50 
10 - - supply -150 - - 
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11 - - demand 30 - - 
12 - - demand 50 - - 
13 - - transit 25 - - 
14 - - demand 75 - - 
Table 3. Data of destroyed arcs 
Infrastructure Source Sink Repairing Cost Upper limit 
Gas 1 3 47 70 
Gas 2 9 50 10 
Gas 3 8 32 45 
Gas 4 8 28 70 
Power 6 1 63 10 
Power 8 9 51 30 
Power 10 8 10 80 
Power 10 13 4 120 
Water 2 1 70 30 
Water 5 1 15 40 
Water 5 8 20 20 
Water 8 6 8.6 40 
Table 4. Capacity data of arcs of lifeline systems 
Components 
Energy System Power System Energy System 
O E C Cons O E C Cons O E C Cons 
1 1 3 70 70 2 3 10 10 2 1 30 30 
2 1 4 80 80 4 1 15 15 2 3 35 50 
3 2 3 0 90 4 2 10 20 2 4 40 60 
4 2 4 50 70 6 1 5 10 2 5 33 100 
5 2 9 8 10 6 4 25 40 5 1 10 40 
6 3 7 20 20 6 2 30 30 5 4 60 60 
7 3 6 10 25 6 5 35 40 5 6 0 15 
8 3 5 0 35 6 8 3 50 5 7 13 15 
9 3 8 40 45 6 3 30 30 5 8 0 20 
10 4 7 20 20 8 7 70 70 8 5 50 50 
11 4 6 25 25 8 9 8 30 8 6 25 40 
12 4 5 25 30 8 11 5 30 8 9 55 55 
13 4 8 60 70 9 11 0 10 8 7 65 65 
14 4 9 0 10 10 8 80 80 - - - - 
15 5 7 0 10 10 7 10 25 - - - - 
16 - - - - 10 11 25 25 - - - - 
17 - - - - 10 14 18 25 - - - - 
18 - - - - 10 13 118 120 - - - - 
19 - - - - 10 12 0 25 - - - - 
20 - - - - 13 14 60 60 - - - - 
21 - - - - 13 12 58 60 - - - - 
O：Source; E: Sink; C: Cost of each flow; Cons: Flow constraint of each flow. 
4.2 Computational Results 
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According to the procedures of the proposed algorithm, we will demonstrate the 3 steps and 
the results as follows. Meanwhile, we have tested that the proposed algorithm can solve 
large-scale problem. 
 Select the critical group 
We first select the critical group in different size from the disrupted components set  by 
the NSGA-II described in Section 3.1. The algorithm is coded by Matlab 2013 version with an 
Intel processor operating at 3.40 GHz and 16 GB RAM, where population size 80S  , 
cross-over rate 0.8  , mutation rate 0.2  , and number of generations 20G   
respectively. The computational results and improvement rates of the corresponding network 
efficiency are shown in Table 5, which demonstrates that the network efficiency increases with 
the group size, therefore, the more components are repaired, the better network efficiency is 
achievable. 
Table 5. The critical group with different size and its efficiency improvement rate 
Group Size Set of Components Efficiency Improvement (%) 
0 / 0 
1 7 9.6 
2 6, 7 17.4 
3 6, 7, 11 21.4 
4 2, 3, 6, 7 28.0 
5 2, 3, 6, 7, 11 34.0 
6 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11 36.0 
7 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12 37.5 
8 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12 38.7 
 
According to Lemma 1, we first get that the optimal group size * 8l  , then we try if the 
makespan of the critical group of size 8 is within the time horizon 24T  . If the makespan 
exceeds the time horizon T , we will go to the critical group of size 7 till we find the feasible 
group size. The computational result demonstrates that the optimal group size * 8l  , with the 
makespan being 24 hours, the corresponding network efficiency improvement being 38.7%, 
and the critical group of arc is a set of ,ria  where the number of arcs 
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{1,  2,  3,  6,  7,  10,  11,  12}r  . 
 Allocate rescue teams 
We employ the proposed heuristic algorithm in Stage II model for the allocation problem with 
8 critical groups and 3 rescue teams, which can be solved by Matlab with the computational 
time of 0.62s. Based on the processing times matrix shown in Table 6, the optimal allocation 
plan assigned to each team is: 1:  {2, 7, 11, 12}K , K2:  {3, 6}, K3:  {1,  10}.  
Table 6. The data of processing time for each rescue team (unit: hours) 
   Arc 
Team 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
K1 15 9 6 5 12 6 3 9 6 3 6 6 
K2 23 17 12 17 18 12 7 15 9 7 15 18 
K3 15 9 8 12 14 9 6 10 11 6 13 12 
 
 Optimize the total costs 
Obtained the assignment plan of each team, we then minimize the total costs by adjustment of 
the operating sequence using Stage I model by the CPLEX solver. The optimal cost equal to 
$1,400,351 in total, and the computational time is 2.02s. The final processing sequence is as 
shown in Fig. 7. 
 
Fig. 7. The optimal scheduling of the rescue teams 
 Test for the algorithm efficiency 
We also test our network efficiency by several scales of network by parallel computing. The 
scale of the problem can be determined by the number of nodes, the number of arcs, the 
number of destroyed components of the whole lifeline network and the number of rescue 
teams. In parallel computing, as the computational complexity of arc selection is 
2( )O P , 
where P  means the size of population size in NSGA-II, and the computational complexity of 
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stage II is 
2 2( ) ( ) ( )O kr O kr O kr  , therefore the maximal computational time of the three 
steps is constrained by the Branch and Bound in Stage I. The computational results under 
different problem scales can be seen in Table 7 and Fig. 8. 
Table 7. The computational time under different scales of problem (unit: second) 
No. of  
Scale 
Scale 
( N A R K   ) 
No. of  
Constraints     
No. of 
Variables 
Computational 
Time(s) 
1 100*160*20*5 1549060 9121 7.69 
2 100*160*20*10 1551580 11521 7.97 
3 200*320*30*5 6936330 16801 12.08 
4 200*320*30*10 6940050 20404 17.08 
5 300*480*40*5 23085200 26881 37.7 
6 300*480*40*10 23090120 31681 38.08 
7 400*640*50*5 38446870 32161 61.65 
8 400*640*50*10 38452990 38161 119.29 
9 500*800*60*5 69178140 39841 186.28 
10 500*800*60*10 69185460 47041 237.5 
11 600*960*70*5 112965410 47521 497.05 
12 600*960*70*10 112973930 55921 542.12 
The biggest network scale the proposed method can solve is 400 nodes with 640 arcs as the 
computational time begins to increase exponentially from the scale 400*640*50*5, which can 
be seen from Fig. 8. 
 
Fig.8. The trend of computational time under different scales of the problem 
 
5. Conclusions and Future Work 
The study has addressed a resource allocation and schedule problem to optimally restore the 
most critical components in the interdependent lifeline systems under disruptions. A general 
two-stage programming model has been developed, where Stage I programming aims to 
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minimize total losses during the time horizon, while stage II programming targets to restore 
system functions as quickly as possible. To solve the two-stage programming, the critical 
group selection approaches are designed to maximize the whole network efficiency firstly. 
Then, a heuristic algorithm has been presented to determine the rescue teams’ assignment 
scheme based on the tasks/components selection process by vulnerability analysis, and the 
optimal repairing sequence is determined in order to minimize the total cost. The problem 
under study has several unique features over previous research: (i) the model provides metrics 
of the whole network and fully integrates the vulnerability analysis into the restoration 
strategy; (ii) the two-stage model takes time priority strategy between total losses and the 
restoration time under time sensitive scenarios; (iii) a solution procedure is developed to solve 
the rescue problem and capable to be applied into real cases. Emergency response stakeholders 
could therefore optimize the resource allocation and scientifically organize the rescue 
procedure, which will greatly improve the capability to respond to emergencies that can 
disrupt the lifeline services. Furthermore, the network vulnerability analysis and resource 
allocation model could be extended and applied to the lifeline system protection strategies. 
 
According to the computational results, the network scale the proposed method can solve is 
400 nodes with 640 arcs, which is enough for the 4 districts in the Case Study. To solve larger 
scale problems, the whole network can be separated into sub-networks with smaller scale as 
the infrastructure connections among districts are usually weak, then it can be solved by the 
proposed method. Further, the proposed approaches under study are only considered 
determined physical status of infrastructures standing on the view of rescue teams. It cannot 
work if we consider from the perspective of top decision makers. In the potential future work, 
we may address the dynamic response strategies from the view of top decision makers 
considering the very complex scenarios. 
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